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Abstract—This paper derives and evaluates a mathematical
structure for identifying economically-efficient transmission aug-
mentations. The mathematical structure is based on the concepts
of sequential-move and simultaneous-move games in applied
mathematics. The Nash equilibrium solution concept has been
reformulated as an optimization problem in the proposed struc-
ture. The problem of multiple Nash equilibria is managed by
introducing the concept of the worst-case Nash equilibrium. Both
the economic concepts of the “efficiency benefit” and “competition
benefit” of the transmission capacity are explicitly modeled in
the proposed structure. A simple three-bus example system and
Garver’s example system are employed and modified to suit the
purpose of analysis. A thorough economic study of these example
systems is presented to highlight the concept and operation of
the proposed mathematical structure from different perspectives.
The results demonstrate the utility of the proposed structure
for measuring the total economic efficiency benefit of additional
transmission capacity.
Index Terms—Competition benefit, economic transmission aug-
mentation, efficiency benefit, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
E CONOMIC augmentation of a transmission system is de-fined as those augmentations that are not required for the
enhancement of system reliability, [1], [2].
Optimal expansion of the transmission network is a critical el-
ement of overall efficient operation of and investment in a liber-
alized electricity market. Insufficient transmission capacity re-
sults in five main costs: Higher than optimal congestion, higher
than optimal power losses, lower than optimal reliability, imper-
fect competition in generation, and inefficient outcomes in the
electricity market [3]. But how should we go about assessing
the economic benefit from a transmission augmentation? Ref-
erences [3] and [4] set up a framework for transmission plan-
ning based on the marginal economic value of transmission ca-
pacity. Reference [5] employs the same mathematical structure
as [3], but uses congestion cost and congestion revenue as the
driving signals of the need for network expansion. This frame-
work has two main shortcomings: the lack of determination of
the efficient level of congestion for a transmission network and
the lack of separate determination of the “competition benefit”
of transmission capacity. References [6] and [7] suggest a new
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algorithm for transmission augmentation based on the conges-
tion cost and the notion of “flatness” of the nodal price profile.
However, the variability of electricity prices over a transmis-
sion network is not an exact measure of competitiveness and is
not suitable for identifying system bottlenecks [5]. In addition,
the planning process does not have a closed-form mathematical
formulation. Furthermore, this approach is unsuccessful inmod-
eling the interaction between the availability of transmission ca-
pacity and market power in generation. Reference [8] suggests
two heuristic procedures for assessing transmission augmenta-
tion. The authors use an unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium
for the set of producers’ bids, while bids from the demand side
are assumed to be fixed and derived from analysis of the existing
market data. However, an unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium
cannot capture the impact of transmission congestion.
On the other hand, [9] showed numerically that transmission
expansion reduces generators’ market power. Reference [10]
empirically examined the bidding behavior of generators in
England and Wales, including the impact of transmission
constraints. The authors report that in England and Wales gen-
erators protected by transmission constraints bid significantly
higher than those not protected. References [11] and [12]
show that generators benefit from a reduction in transmission
capacity. Using a simplified version of the power network
in California, [13] has quantified the impact of local market
power and transmission capacity. Using a stylized version of
the North American transmission system, [14] highlights the
effect of transmission capacity on competition among gen-
erating companies (GenCos). Unlike the efficiency effect of
transmission capacity, the competition effect has not received
enough attention in transmission planning methodologies. In
the survey articles [15]–[17] no mention is made of literature
on the modeling of market power and the assessment of com-
petition benefits as a component of economic transmission
augmentation.
The TEAM methodology introduced by the California ISO
[18] is one possible model for analyzing economic-efficiency-
based transmission augmentation. However, it has two draw-
backs. First, the strategic bidding of GenCos was modeled using
a tailor-mademethodology which limits its application. Second,
the approach does not have an integrated mathematical frame-
work.
In the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) the
“regulatory test” introduced by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Competition (ACCC) is used as the transmission
augmentation criterion by the transmission network service
providers in different states. In February 2003, the ACCC pub-
lished a discussion paper reviewing the regulatory test. In that
report, whether or not the “competition benefit” of transmission
capacity should be included in the regulatory test was one of
the key themes discussed. Traditionally, in Australia modeling
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of the operation of the transmission system for the purposes of
assessing a proposed augmentation has assumed a simplified
form of generator behavior (such as assuming generators bid
at marginal cost). This approach has ruled out calculation of
the impact of a transmission augmentation on competition
between generators. Reference [19] reviews the practical im-
plementation issues arising from the different approaches to the
measurement of competition benefits proposed by interested
parties. Reference [20] proposes a heuristic approach for eval-
uating competition benefits of transmission capacity. But the
question of how best to compute the competition benefit of a
transmission augmentation in the context of the regulatory test
is still largely unresolved.
Using multilevel programming, this paper derives a closed-
form mathematical structure for assessing a transmission aug-
mentation. The Nash equilibrium solution concept is employed
to model the future condition of the electricity market. The var-
ious Nash equilibria are formulated as the zeros of a nonnegative
function. The “worst-case” Nash equilibrium is selected as the
relevant equilibrium point of the electricity market for the pur-
poses of transmission planning.
The proposed approach is illustrated using a simple three-bus
example system and a modified Garver’s example system.
The mathematical derivation of the problem is set out in
Section II. The experimental results and discussions are set out
in Section III. Section IV concludes.
II. MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION
OF THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE
In the light of the electricity market in Australia, the owner
and operator of the transmission network—the transmission
network service provider (TNSP)—is assumed to be a reg-
ulated monopoly business. The TNSP is required, amongst
other things, to efficiently plan the transmission network and
provide a competitive environment for market participants. The
GenCos are assumed to be independent commercial entities
whose objective is to maximize their economic profit (revenues
less costs). Finally, the market management company (MMC)
is assumed to play the role of manager and operator of the
electricity market. The MMC is completely independent from
both the TNSPs and the GenCos. We consider a decentralized
noncooperative decision system with one leader and several
followers. We assume that the leader and followers may have
their own decision variables and objective functions. The leader
can only influence the reaction of followers through his own
decision variables, while the followers have full authority to
decide how to optimize their objective functions with respect
to the leader’s decision as well as other followers’ decisions.
Multilevel programming [21] is used to find the optimal trans-
mission augmentation path.
Section II-A deals with the application of the Nash concept
for modeling competition between GenCos. The formulation of
the Nash equilibrium concept as an optimization problem en-
ables the structure to identify all the Nash equilibria of the game.
Section II-B models the TNSP as the leader of the two-stage
game. The problem of multiple Nash points is tackled through
the selection of the socially “worst” Nash equilibrium in terms
of total cost of generation and total value of lost load.
Fig. 1. Marginal cost curve and the biding strategy of a GenCo.
A. Nash Equilibria of the Simultaneous Move Price-Quantity
Game Among GenCos as Zeros of Function
The cost function of a generating company can be modeled
as a quadratic function of the form (1):
(1)
In (1), ($/MW ), , and ($/MW) are the cost function
coefficients. The quadratic cost function can be approximated
by a linear function of the form (2):
(2)
In (2), is the total generation capacity, and is the genera-
tion level of GenCo assigned by the MMC. Each GenCo offers
a price-quantity pair to theMMC to participate in the
market. The marginal cost of a GenCo and its bidding strategy
are shown in Fig. 1.
($) and are the minimum and maximum
limits on a price offer of a GenCo. These limits are usually
set by the electricity market regulator. Competition on price
(the so-called “Bertrand” game), competition on quantity (the
so-called “Cournot” game), and competition on both price
and quantity are permitted in this structure. Given the bidding
strategies of other GenCos and the current state of the network,
each GenCo finds its optimal strategy using the bilevel pro-
gramming problem set out in (3):
(3)
In (3), VoLL is the value of lost load, [B] is a ma-
trix with as the total number of buses in the system. is the
vector of bus angles, g and d are the generation level of com-
mitted generators and the served demand of retailers. is the
MW flow between nodes and is the maximum thermal
capacity for the branch ij. Also, is the susceptance of the
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branch ij in mho, is the existing number of circuits, and
is the TNSP decision variable on new circuits. Vectors u and v
are the Lagrange multipliers of the associated constraints. The
vector v is the price of energy at different network connection
points.
Using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions, (3)
can be generalized as in (4):
(4)
where in (4), is the TNSP decision vector,
is the action vector of the th GenCo,
and y is the vector with as the
total number of GenCos. The vector z is equal to (g,d, ,u,v);
this vector is constrained by the set Z, which is the set defined
by the constraints of the inner optimization problem in (3).
Since all GenCos are of equal status, they must reveal their
strategies simultaneously. The most common solution concept
in this context is the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as the
problem of finding the zeros of a function R which is defined
in (5).
Definition 1: Let Y be a nonempty set which defines the
strategy space of all GenCos participating in the electricity
market. The function is defined as (5):
(5)
The following theorem follows:
Theorem: The function is real and nonneg-
ative on Y. Also, Nash equilibria are the zeros of R.
Proof: Let be a strategy that belongs to a strategy space
and be the profit function of player in game G. Also,
let be the strategy of all other players of the game G except
player . is the Nash equilibrium
of the game G if for every player and for every strategy
If we define , then
The mathematical framework for competition among GenCos
can be now set out as in (6):
(6)
If an array satisfies
, then must be a solution
of (6) and consequently a Nash equilibrium of the game. The
set of all optimal solutions of (5) are the Nash equilibria of the
price-quantity game among GenCos. If (5) does not have any
optimal solution, there is no Nash equilibrium of GenCos in the
given programming problem. Section II-B addresses the issue
of multiple Nash equilibria and the TNSP objective function.
B. Worst Nash Equilibrium and the TNSP Mathematical
Structure for Augmentation
The set of Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game can be
found by solving the optimization problem formulated in (6).
Reference [20] uses averaging to deal with the many Nash
equilibria of the quantity game among GenCos. This method-
ology first calculates the market outcome under each Nash
equilibrium and then takes an average for each of the variables
of interest for the purposes of transmission augmentation. The
problem with this method is that there is no theoretical basis
for adopting the average of a set of Nash equilibria. Even
more concerning, in many cases the average of the variables
of interest may not satisfy simple intuitive relationships (for
example, average price differences may arise between locations
even when average flows are not at their maximum). This di-
minishes the value of the results for transmission augmentation
decisions.
This paper introduces the concept of the socially worst Nash
equilibrium. The worst Nash equilibrium is the one which has
the highest social cost to the society. The social cost is defined
as the total cost of generation and total value of lost load. The
mathematical formulation of the worst Nash equilibrium is set
out in (7):
(7)
In (7), the objective function is the total cost to society which
must be computed for each of Nash equilibria of the GenCos’
price-quantity game.
Suppose L is the set of all upgrade and expansion projects
available for the TNSP. The is the cost of transmission
project between buses i and j and is the number of circuits
in the transmission corridor . is the maximum value
for the integer variable . The vector n is the TNSP’s design
parameter.
The mathematical structure of the TNSP’s problem can be
formulated as (8):
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(8)
The objective function in (8) is the sum of the transmission
investment cost of upgrade/expansion projects, the operating
cost of the GenCos, and the total value of lost load when
GenCos exercise market power. The difference between the
overall social cost when the GenCos exercise market power
when all the GenCos are price-takers (i.e., have no market
power) is the competition benefit of the additional transmission
capacity. Note that the “competition benefit” is the additional
market benefit brought about by enhanced generator com-
petition resulting from the transmission augmentation. The
transmission planning schedule is for the highest forecast
demand in the horizon year of planning. The coefficient is
the duration of this load scenario in hours.
The overall social objective is to upgrade and/or expand the
transmission system with the minimum overall social cost.
The optimization problem set out in (8) is a closed-form
mathematical structure for the assessment of transmission aug-
mentation. In (8), the TNSP moves first and designs the future
transmission system. Based on the planning schedule, the Nash
equilibria of the price-quantity game are calculated. In the next
step, the worst Nash equilibrium is found and the generation
costs and total value of lost load of the worst Nash equilibrium
are added to the TNSP’s planning schedule cost to determine
the total cost of a particular expansion. The socially-optimal
planning schedule is the one which minimizes overall social
cost.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Two example systems, namely, a simple three-node example
system and the modified Garver’s example system, are used to
illustrate the proposed methodology for assessing transmission
augmentation.
A. Simple Three-Node Example System
The proposed approach in (8) is applied first to a simple three-
node system, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Transmission lines , and connect buses 1, 2, and 3.
The transmission investment cost on these lines are 1, 2, and 3
M$/Cct. There are two competing generators labelled GenCo1
and GenCo2, and two competing retailers labelled R1 and R2
in the three-bus example system. The characteristics of the gen-
erators, retailers, and the transmission network are set out in








TRANSMISSION NETWORK AUGMENTATION DATA
Tables I–III, respectively. The upgrade or expansion projects for
the existing transmission system are set out in Table IV.
For each GenCo, the price-quantity pair offered to
the MMC has been approximated by a set of discrete variables.
For demonstrative purposes, the scaling factor on the marginal
cost is fixed at 1.0 (so each GenCo bids its “true” marginal cost)
and the scaling factor on generation capacity is between 10%
and 100% of true generation capacity in steps of 1.84%. This is
equivalent to 50 different possible announced generation capac-
ities for each GenCo.
Case A: The Traditional Model for Economic-Based Trans-
mission Augmentation: The traditional model of transmission
augmentation is a nonconvex, nonlinear, and mixed-integer pro-
gramming problem. Using the DICOP solver in the GAMS plat-
form [24], the traditional approach to assessing transmission
augmentation has been carried out for the three-node example
system. The traditional model does not approve any augmen-
tation for the three-node example system set out above. The
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Fig. 3. Economic dispatch results of the three-node example system augmented
based on the traditional model; all GenCos are competitive.
Fig. 4. Marginal cost curve and the strategy curve of GenCo1 and GenCo2
considering the transmission system augmented based on the traditional model.
Fig. 5. Economic dispatch results of the three-node example system augmented
based on the traditional model; GenCos behave strategically.
dispatch of GenCos, retailers, and the resulting line flows are
shown in Fig. 3. Considering the transmission augmentation so-
lution based on the traditional model, the worst Nash equilib-
rium was found and is as set out in Fig. 4.
As shown in Fig. 4, under the traditional augmentationmodel,
GenCo1 offers its true marginal cost to the MMC, but GenCo2
offers only 108.16 MW of its capacity to the MMC. In other
words, GenCo2 withholds about 50% of its true capacity.
The dispatch results allowing for the strategic behaviour of
GenCos and the augmented transmission system based on the
traditional model is shown in Fig. 5.
Under the traditional model of augmentation, the total trans-
mission investment cost is $0.0 (since no augmentation is found
to be economically justified) and the social cost, based on the
worst Nash equilibrium and the weighting factor of ,
is $4 294 592.
Case B: The Proposed Model for Economic-Based Trans-
mission Augmentation: The outcome under the traditional ap-
proach can now be compared with the outcome under the pro-
posed methodology set out in (8), which approves the building
of a 20-MW circuit between nodes 2 and 3. The worst Nash
Fig. 6. Marginal cost curve and the strategy curve of GenCo 1 and GenCo2
considering the transmission system augmented based on the proposed model.
Fig. 7. Economic dispatch results of the three-node example system augmented
based on the proposed model; GenCos behave strategically.
equilibrium of GenCo1 and GenCo2 considering the 20-MW
augmentation of transmission system is found and is as indi-
cated in Fig. 6.
As is clear from Fig. 6, the additional 20-MW augmentation
encourages GenCo2 to behave more competitively.
In this case, GenCo2 offers 148.56 MW of its capacity to
the energy market (compared to 108.16 MW under the tradi-
tional approach). The transmission investment cost is $2 M and
the social cost associated with the worst Nash equilibrium of
the market with the weighting factor of is $233 570.
Under the traditional model, GenCo2 withholds around 50% of
its true capacity from the market. Adding a 20-MW circuit be-
tween nodes 1 and 3 causes GenCo2 to offer 148.56 MW of
its capacity to the market—an improvement of 50% over its of-
fered capacity before augmentation. The dispatch results when
the GenCos bid strategically and the transmission system has
been augmented based on the proposedmodel is shown in Fig. 7.
The decomposition of the total benefit of the additional trans-
mission capacity into its components, namely, competition ben-
efit and efficiency benefit, using the methodology of part B of
the Appendix is illustrated in Fig. 8.
In fact, as shown in Fig. 8, the additional transmission ca-
pacity between buses 2 and 3 only has value for improving com-
petition between generators and does not have any traditional
efficiency benefit.
B. Modified Garver’s Six-Bus Example System
Let’s now apply the proposed methodology to a modified
Garver’s six-bus example system. Garver’s example system has
beenmodified to reflect a networkwith six buses and eight trans-
mission lines. The key parameters of the system are presented
in Tables V–VIII.
The single line diagram of the example system is shown in
Fig. 9.
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Fig. 8. Decomposition of total benefit of the transmission capacity added to the
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The strategy plane of each GenCo consists of ten actions. In
each action, the price bid is set at marginal cost and the quantity
bid varies from 10% to total generation capacity in steps of 10%.
Fig. 9. Modified Garver’s example system.
Fig. 10. Modified Garver’s example system augmented by the traditional
method (no augmentation) and proposed method (dashed lines).
As in the previous example, the traditional model of transmis-
sion planning approves no transmission augmentations in the
proposed network (no augmentations pass the economic cost-
benefit test). In contrast, the proposed approach finds that the op-
timal planning schedule is the vector
(i.e., upgrades to lines 2, 6, and 7). This transmission planning
schedule is shown in Fig. 10.
The price-quantity offers of the GenCos in the case of (A)
the original transmission network (B) the transmission network
augmented using the proposed methodology are reported in
Table IX.
As in Table IX, the total offered capacity, the total withheld
capacity, and HHI1 have been improved by 11.57%, 6%, and
4.50%, respectively. As shown in Table IX, the proposed ap-
proach results in a significantly lower total social cost than the
traditional approach.
Fig. 11 decomposes the total benefit of the proposed augmen-
tations into the competition benefit and the efficiency benefit.
As in Fig. 11, the efficiency benefit of the proposed transmis-
sion planning schedule is 1206 ($/h), compared with an invest-
ment cost of $1 140 000, so this planning schedule does not pass
1The Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of a market is the sum of the
squares of the market shares of the firms which are active in the market. If the
market share of firm is , the HHI is then defined as .
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TABLE IX
PRICE-QUANTITY OUTCOMES OF GENCOS 1, 2, AND 3
FOUND BASED ON THE WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Fig. 11. Decomposition of total benefit of the transmission capacity added
to the system to the competition benefit and efficiency benefit—proposed ap-
proach.
a cost-benefit test under the traditional approach. However, this
transmission planning schedule has a competition benefit with
total value of 2 080 414 ($/h). Since the proposed mathematical
structure captures both the efficiency benefit and the competi-
tion benefit of transmission capacity, the transmission planning
schedule is approved under our proposed structure.
Fig. 12 shows that the prices at each of the buses after the
transmission augmentation selected by the proposed approach
are closer to the competitive locational prices than the prices that
arise in the transmission system augmented by the traditional
approach.
In both cases, case A and B, the GenCos withdraw their ca-
pacity from the market in such a way that the available capacity
is lower than the total demand, so that some load is shed. In this
example, this load-shedding cannot be alleviated by transmis-
sion augmentation alone.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper derives and evaluates a mathematical structure
which identifies economically-efficient transmission augmen-
tations. The proposed mathematical structure is based on game
Fig. 12. Price at different buses in three cases of (A) original transmission net-
work (B) augmented transmission network using the proposed approach.
theory concepts in applied mathematics. The TNSP, GenCos,
and MMC are mathematically modeled in the proposed struc-
ture in a way which reflects the scope for strategic interaction in
a liberalized electricity market. The structure has been designed
in such a way as to allow an assessment of both the improve-
ments in efficiency and the competitiveness resulting from
a transmission augmentation. Policy makers can and should
use transmission expansion decisions to increase competition
between generators. The proposed mathematical structure and
the associated numerical solution techniques (set out in another
paper) are a promising framework towards achieving this goal.
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